Conspicary and Human Right Abuse in Papua

Conspicary and Human Right Abuse in Papua

(Indonesia Govenment and Frreport Repress Papuan People)

By David Raja Marpaung S.IP M.Def

Introduction

Freeport’s Grasberg mine in Indonesia’s easternmost province, Irian Jaya (also known as West Papua), is one of the world’s richest mining operations. Recent estimates suggest that the mine has both the third largest reserves of copper, and the second largest reserves ofgold, in the world. With much of the necessary infrastructure already in place, production costs are also unusually low. In addition, the unknown potential of the largest corebody, the Grasberg, where the base of the ore deposit has yet to be identified, and of several additionalorebodies currently being explored, suggests that the mine’s life could extend for at least another 30 years.

The wealth of Freeport’s Irian mine is reflected in the relationship between the company and the Indonesian government. Freeport, which is responsible for about twothirds of Indonesia’s annual production of gold, is regularly amongst the largest corporate tax-payers in the country. However, its strategic importance to the state exceeds its monetary value. In recognition both of its wealth and its status as the first symbol of foreign investment confidence in the New Order government, the Freeport mine has been declared one of ten “national assets”.Freeport is also the jewel in the crown of provincial development for Irian Jaya, accounting for 88 percent of the province’s non-oil exports; however, there has been considerable resentment in Jayapura over the poor returns to the province from the royalties paid to Jakarta.

Overall, The relationship between Freeport and the indigenous Papuan peoples has been influenced by a set of interrelated dynamics, with explicit human rights dimensions, specifically: (1) the flawed integration of Papua into the Republic of Indonesia and subsequent Papuan resistance to Indonesian sovereignty; (2) the top-down, paternalistic, and nonparticipatory economic and social development policies and practices of the Indonesian government; (3) the counterinsurgency operations of the Indonesian military which have been carried out in order to defend Freeport's mining operations and other investment projects externally imposed upon local indigenous communities;(4) the corrupt governance practices of the Suharto regime and overall lack of the rule of law in Indonesia

State Conspiracy

The conspiracy started in 1988, fifteen years before the expiry date of the first contract, when Freeport Indonesia found the Grasberg deposit containing at least 72 million ounces of pure gold, silver and copper worth an estimated US$ 60 billion easily mined because it lay close to the surface.

Not wanting to lose the treasure, the boss of PT Freeport Indonesia, Bob Muffet made several strategic maneuvers to approach high-ranking officials in the Indonesian government. One of those targeted was Ginandjar, then Minister of Mining and Energy. Muffet and Ginandjar became close allies, as reported in The Asian Wall Street Journal in early October 1988. The two visited each other often, played golf together and dined in luxurious restaurants.

Freeport Indonesia proposed an extension of their contract in 1989, with an extension of the mining area to include the Grasberg site. Ginandjar negotiated for an increase in taxes and a bigger cut for the Indonesian government. Their share was raised from 10% to 20%. The agreement was signed on 30 December 1991. But the additional 10% was allocated to a private company named Bakrie Investindo. “What was going on? Is the Bakrie group more privileged than the Indonesian government? How much did you get Pak Ginandjar?” asked a member of Commission VIII, Nur Hasan. 

The Bakrie group bought 10% of the shares in Freeport Indonesia for US$ 212.5 million. US$ 49 million was paid in cash but the remainder was pledged through syndicated credit from international banks. To cover for the doubt about Bakrie’s financial condition, Freeport Indonesia guaranteed the credit. One year later, Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold Inc. reimbursed half of Bakrie’s shares at quadruple the price. 

Other allegations focus on the fact that PT Catur Yasa, owned by Ginandjar’s brother Agus Kartasasmita, was brought in to establish and maintain the electrical power plant for the mine. Commission VIII also questioned the involvement of the A Latief Corporation (ALC) owned by former Minister of Man Power Abdul Latief, which supplied peripheral facilities to support the mine, including hotels, housing complexes, soldiers barracks and even golf courses. Astrid S Susanto, a House members who is also a professor at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at the University of Indonesia, told detikworld that the second contract between Freeport and the Indonesian government was legally defective. 

He claimed the agreement, known as Kontrak Karya II, was lex specialis, beyond Indonesian law. “Lex specialis is only supposed to be applied to several articles. But the whole Kontrak Karya II agreement was lex specialis,” explained Astrid. In this matter, the lex specialis agreement should be agreed by the House. “Now it depends whether the House agrees with that agreement,” said Astrid. 

In an interesting development which cause much excitement at the Attorney General’s offices today, a photocopiy of a warrant to detain Ginandjar in connection to alleged corruption, collusion and nepotism cases during former president Suharto’s regime was widely circulated. Signed on Thursday, 6 July 2000, the warrant ordered the Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes, Ramelan SH, to detain Suharto’s cronies, listed among them, Ginandjar. Other notable names on the list are former Vice President Soedarmono, former State Secretary Sa’adilah Mursyid and two infamous tycoons, namely Soedono Salim and Prajogo Pangestu.

After reformation era, it is believe the recent government is still continuing receive some amount of money "corrupt and gratitification: from Freeport.

Human Rights Abuse

Some of the categories of human rights abuse in the area of Freeport’s operations are summarized below. While very few of these cases have been individually established or proven legally, the weight of evidence suggests that most are credible and that, at the very least, further detailed investigation is warranted.

• The extrajudicial killing of as many as 200 people between 1975 and 1997, in and around the Freeport COW area, almost all of them unarmed civilians11

• Disappearance, arbitrary detention and torture • Rape and other forms of sexual abuse • Intimidation and harassment

sation

• Loss of land and livelihood without negotiation and without adequate compensation • Forced resettlement • Environmental degradation resulting in an unsafe environment • Destruction of ritually or culturally significant sites without consultation

Since 1996, Freeport has adopted several initiatives that indicate some willingness to address human rights concerns:

• A significant increase in funding for community development was announced in 1996,though the effect of this funding has been somewhat derailed by the heightening of tension and intra-community politics since the 1996 riots. Revisions in company

policies on indigenous employment opportunities, more formalised (though still

ungme leader Tom Beanal to the Freeport Indonesia board indicate a will on the part of the company to tackle some of the problems that have plagued its relations with local communities. • In 1999, Freeport McMoRan announced a Social and Human Rights Policy which s

troubled) processes of recognition for land releases, and the appointment of Amets out guidelines for staff conduct, requires annual compliance reports, and mandates regular training for its staff. Crucially, the policy states that:

of a human rights violation to the appropriate government authorities,

• In 2000, Freeport McMoRan and Rio Tinto signed the UK-USA Voluntary Statement of Principles on Human Rights and Security. • The appointment of Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald,via in The Hague, as a member of the Board of Directors and Special Counsel to the Chairman on Human Rights. Judge McDonald has been quoted as saying that, ‘Those [incidents of the past] have been investigated, but there isn’t really any closure to it yet. Let’s end it. And whatever shows up, let it show up’

• In a recent development, Freeport has denied use of its helicopters to the military,risking the wrath of the government but citing the problems associated with use of Freeport facilities as a base in the 1996 Lorentz Park hostage crisis

The presence of large numbers of troops at Freeport appears to have exacerbated, rather than resolved, local conflict. In addition to the mysterious killings and disappearances, which area trademark of military operations elsewhere in the Indonesian archipelago, there have been numerous violent clashes between different military and police units competing for the same lucrative economic opportunities in the Timika area. Most of these business interests involve access to Freeport materiel or to land which the indigenous communities regard as theirs, with the consequence that Freeport staff and local communities are potential casualties in the cross-fire. 

A reliable estimate of troop casualties in the Freeport area shows that far more soldiers and police have been killed by other government troops than by armed

Papuan resistance (or OPM). The continued presence of units that have perpetrated human rights abuses in the past also hinders reconciliation between the company and the community. Very credible reports are available to suggest that the landscape at Freeport is saturated with locations where bodies have been disposed of – along the road between Timika and Tembagapura, and in the vicinity of various army and police posts, most of them constructed by Freeport or its contractors. The security forces are understandably reluctant to have these locations

properly investigated. As long as historical cases of disappearance or the removal of corpses remain unsolved, a real reconciliation between Freeport and the Amungme and other Papuan communities of the area remains a distant prospect.

Bribes to Indonesia Police and Military Officer

Since the early 1970s, the Indonesian military has used Freeport-built infrastructure (e.g.,airport, roads, port site) as a staging ground for deadly assaults against the original Papuan landowners in the mine's vicinity-actions purported to be undertaken for protection of the mine and the elimination of popular resistance to Indonesian sovereignty.

The first documented Indonesian military killings of indigenous people in the Freeport area occurred in 1972. Researchers have recorded more than 150 cases of individual killings of Amungme and other indigenous people in and around the mine since the 1970s, as well as hundreds of additional deaths amongst these populations from illness and injury due to forced relocation and military attacks.

Freeport has provided considerable financial and logistical support-as well as equipment-to the Indonesian military and police. Police have been present at the mine site since the early construction period. For years, a unit of fewer than 100 soldiers occupied the area, but following the Amungme sabotage of Freeport's copper slurry pipeline in 1977, the Indonesian Armed Forces engaged in numerous attacks on local indigenous people, including killings, rape, and other assaults. The military presence increased exponentially following the discovery of the Grasberg deposit, rising to at least 1,850 soldiers by 1996.

       The Indonesian government has acknowledged the active measures taken by the military to expand its authority in the Freeport COW areas. Referring to a March 1996 riot that caused a temporary shutdown of mining operations, in which company management described seeing individuals with "walkie-talkies" and straight hair (i.e., non-Papuans; presumably plainclothes military personnel) orchestrating the violence

Freeport agreed to pay the military a one-time sum of $35 million, to be supplemented by an annual "donation" of $11 million. Internal company documents provide information on Freeport's expenditures for military headquarters, recreational facilities, "guard houses and guard posts, barracks, parade grounds

and ammunition storage facilities," as well as offices for two Army advisors, totaling $5,160,770 for the Army and an additional $4,060,000 for police. 

Now, the Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) has discovered transfers of US$79.1 million from PT Freeport Indonesia to the police. Based on its financial reports from 2001 to 2010, PT Freeport has cumulatively paid US$79.1 million to Indonesian security authorities.  Related with that, Critics have urged the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to immediately probe mining giant PT Freeport Indonesia’s security funds allocated to the Papua Police despite assurances from the company that the money is legal.