Redesign Papua Conflict Resolution

Redesign Papua Conflict Resolution
By David Raja Marpaung

Understanding the roots of conflict in Papua• Papua problem has become tangled konfik cycle for few decades in Indonesia, therefore there is no cheap and easy way , except for the hard work of the 'sweating' and a higher risk of all parties.

 • Based on the results of studies that have been made TIM LIPI in Papua Road Map can be concluded that the sources of Papua konfik can be grouped into four main issues, namely, first, marginalization and discrimination experienced by indigenous Papuans as a result of economic development, cultural policy and the mass migration in Papua since 1970 until today. The second problem is the failure of development and it is necessary for such a new paradigm of development in Papua. The third problem is the contradiction of understanding the history of integration and the construction of political identities between Papua and Jakarta. The fourth problem is the experience of a long history of political violence in Papua, especially those committed by state actors against Indonesian citizens in Papua.Reflecting on the mapping of the root causes of conflict in Papua, then at least there is some conflict mitigation solutions that can be offered to the 

A. Short-Term SolutionIn the short term period, there are two things to get attention of the stakeholders in the conflict in Papua.

Phase 1. Desecuritization Papua Conflict• It should be noted that desekuritisasi not mean a total reduction of security forces in Papua. However, desekuritisasi security approach is a model more in line with the principles of democracy and peaceful conflict resolution. Associated with the TNI desecuritization covers the main aspects. First, each placement (deployment) military personnel in Papua have to go through a political decision between the government and the House of Representatives or in accordance with military law mandated mechanisms. It is important to avoid the occurrence of behavioral / illegal operation. Second, the placement of military personnel in Papua should be measured both the quantity, quality, duration and target its operations so that the people of Indonesia as a whole can monitor the performance of TNI in Papua. Then, thirdly, the military should be used wherever possible approaches to non-violence (more persuasive than repressive) in Papua. It is very important, considering the face of 'Indonesia' in Papua is often recognized only to the extent of violence forces rather than as an entity that protects all the people of Papua.

• In relation to law enforcement (police) then they should immediately evaluate the security policies in Papua. Often, law enforcement officers acted in accordance with its identity as the state apparatus, especially in the context of the interests of foreign corporations in Papua. As a result, it is not surprising when there are still people who think that the Papua law enforcement in Indonesia is a form of 'colonization' of the land of Papua is not 'The Indonesia's' sense of justice because they are injured. Discriminatory practices by the authorities should be evaluated by the government because it will further aggravate the face of 'Indonesia' in Papua

• In addition, the Government may use the instrument of internal control in monitoring the performance of state officials in Papua, for example by placing a representative / office of National Human Rights Commission, Ombudsman, Kompolnas, Agency in Papua; It can be effective as a state institution in charge of giving a correction to other state agencies as well as provide security for the people of Papua.

• Strategically, desekuritisasi will foster mutual trust both between governments and people of Papua that the conflict can be resolved without any suspicion by the dominance of the security approach. This then encourages the formation of the next stage.

Phase 2. Strengthen the dialogue as a discourse of conflict resolution• Both the government and the Papuan people must realize that dialogue is a model of conflict resolution that occupy the top priority. Government should be encouraged to realize that so far there has been marginalized politically, socially, economically and culturally to the people of Papua in the context of Indonesia's All. Meanwhile, the Papuan people should also realize that violence is not the only way to remind the government's negligence. Build this awareness is the key for both parties (government and people of Papua) to be able to sit together and discuss solutions to offer.• Discourse dialogue must gain legitimacy from both sides, rather than a party merely to avoid the politicization of the peace efforts of either party. 

B. Long-Term SolutionWhen desecuritization Papua conflict has been implemented and intensified dialogue discourse, then the next step was to conduct a dialogue that includes three stages: 

Phase 1. Identification of actors and issues in the dialogue• In the context of dialogue, identification of actors into the process early will determine the legitimacy of the dialogue. It is important to prevent any parties who feel excluded from conflict resolution and potentially disrupt the dialogue.• Identification of actors should carefully consider the issues to be discussed and the interest to be negotiated in the dialog.• In addition, it should also be noted that a representative of the location of the dialogue as an observer and mediator / party agenda to keep the dialogue remains consistent.

Phase 2. Importance of Reconciliation in Dialogue• The main purpose of dialogue is to build mutual trust between the actors in the conflict to want to talk about conflict resolution that can be agreed.• One of the key elements to build trust is through reconciliation.• Reconciliation requires a mutual understanding between the parties to the conflict that they are 'victims' of conflict with violence.• Therefore, efforts to resolve the conflict by force will only add to the victim in each of the parties without any constructive solution for the future of Papua.

Phase 3. Build understanding that dialogue is sustainability (continuity)• Dialogue is not how fast (instant) to resolve the conflict. However, the dialogue is how to manage conflict more dignified than the use of violence will only lead to losses on each side.• Model ways of thinking (mindset) like it should dominate every actor in dialogue in order not to return to violence in the event of a deadlock in negotiations. Expected when there is deadlock in the negotiations, each actor must hold back and re-scheduled dialogue with a clearer mind.Key Success Conflict Resolution in Papua• Resolution of conflict in Papua is not confined to the central government and the Papuan People alone, but the responsibility of the whole people of Indonesia. Here, the importance of strengthening the awareness of all the people of Indonesia that the identity of 'The Indonesia-ness' in Papua has been held hostage by violence in the conflict. Therefore, non-violent peace efforts to the conflict in Papua have to get the full support of all the people of Indonesia.• As a democratic country, then the ways of conflict resolution through violence in Indonesia is rightly not a priority. Instead, conflict resolution should be put in particular peaceful means through dialogue. Both the government and the groups involved in conflicts in Papua have to stop all acts of violence for any reason.Concluding Note• Settlement of the conflict in Papua is one of the major test for the Indonesian people to be able to resolve the conflict with dignity. In this context, at least Indonesia has had experience in resolving peacefully the conflict in Aceh.• Relies only on the government alone will not guarantee that problems can be resolved peacefully Papua. However, an even more important is to strengthen solidarity and solidity all elements of the Indonesian people to support and engage in real (concrete) in conflict resolution efforts of dignity to our brothers in Papua

Indonesia Defense Management

Indonesia Defense Management

(Part I)

By David Raja Marpaung S.IP, M.Def

            I will separate the article to be two part. The first part will discuss first three element of defense management that consists of force planning, resource planning, and weapon system planning. In other article, will observe the supporting streams, that consist with logistics, C4SRI (command, control, communication computer, surveillance, reconnaissance, information), and civil emergency.

            Military force in a certain country is built to defend the endurance of the state towards other military threats launched by foreign country. According to Peter Paret, military force is an implemented expression of national power applied through the deployment and employment of armed forces[1]. In order to make sure the development and sustainability of military forces, the government especially ministry of defense needs to make defense planning and management.

            Defense planning and management is a comprehensive endeavor that encompasses six different areas. There are three core areas: force, resource and weapon systems planning; and three supporting streams: logistics, C4SRI (command, control, communication computer, surveillance, reconnaissance, information), and civil emergency.

Force Planning

            Force Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. Ensuring that a modern military has the appropriate personnel and capabilities is the key goal of military force planning It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services.

            Former Indonesia Defense Ministry Juwono Sudarsono Said Force planning deals specifically with providing Indonesia with the forces and capabilities of the tri-services to execute their range of missions, in accordance with the Indonesia doctrine of total defence and security (sishankamrata). It seeks to ensure that Indonesia develop sustainable and interoperable forces, which can function even with limited or scarce budgetary resources[2]. 

            The force planning process is based on three sequential elements: general political guidance, planning targets and defense reviews. Political guidance sets out the overall aims to be met, incorporating President S.B. Yudhoyono’s concept of Minimum Essential Force (MEF) that establishes in military terms the number, scale and nature of operational readiness and force structure that the country as a whole should at a minimum be able to deploy. 

            Planning targets include both a detailed determination of an integrated tri-service force (Tri-Matra Terpadu) requirements and the setting of implementation targets to fulfill those requirements. Defense reviews provide a means to assess the degree to which planning targets are being met. The term ‘force planning’ is often confused with that of ‘defense planning’, which is much broader (includes non-military defense planning), and that of ‘operational planning’, which is conducted for specific, tactical and command-level military operations, including balancing strike force, support and maintenance/repair capabilities. 

            But then several question comes up related with these concept, especially Minimum essential Force (MEF). Ministry of Defence has planned to transform the current defence posture by using conceptual framework of Minimum Essential Forces (MEF). This concept will bridge the transition process prior to the development of new defence posture compatible with the concept of policy and strategy on national defence. Indonesian government introduces the MEF-styled concept in its Mid-Term National Development Plan of the Year of 2004-2009[3].

            The problem is there is no definitely definition about MEF. According to the Ministry of Defense version; the minimum essential force is the minimum of the defense forces are capable of causing prevent impact. And minimum essential force emphasis on capability-based planning. That is, there are a number of capabilities designed capable implemented by these forces. The MEF-styled defense concept is rooted in “capability-base approach”. Thus, the government should combine such approach with “task-oriented approach” to ensure that the TNI always has high-qualified striking force to launch unexpected short-term military operations. The task-oriented approach is a followup towards assertive-approach and territorial control that become the basic concept for military deployment in strategic compartments[4]

.           The Question is how much or how many is the minimum forces to prevent threat?.   With MEF, Indonesia armed forces will be directed to preventing the war but not winning the war.  Compare with US Maritime Strategic “preventing the war as equal as winning the war”.

            It is true that the birth of the concept of minimum essential force could not be separated with economic consideration. But we must realistic with calculation of the amount of force that needed to secure our archipelago. For example, do we have enough maritime force (124 combat ships, and 74 airplane ) to cover all our territory.

Resources Planning

            Resources Planning can be define as detail summary of all types of resources (equipment, human, finance, time, etc) that required to complete a specific task such as military transformation, defense development, and etc. Reasonable framework to assess the effectiveness of the state to build its defense force must be correlated to the capacity of the state to convert its national resources to become a coercive tool.

            Juwono Sudarsono  Said National resources comprise human resources, natural resources and man-made resources. National resource planning aims to provide the country with the capabilities it needs, but focuses on the elements that are joined in common funding; each service pool resources within a nation-wide total defense framework[5].

            Resource planning is closely linked to operational planning, which aims to ensure that the Indonesian Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) fulfill its present and minimum operational commitments and face new threats such as terrorism and bio-chemical weapons. There is a distinction between joint funding and common funding: joint funding covers activities, managed by the Ministry of Defense (Dephan) and TNI Headquarters (Mabes TNI), such as integrated acquisitions and procurement of common use items.

            Common funding involves three different budgets: the civil budget, which covers the running costs of Dephan and Mabes TNI; the military budget, which essentially covers the running costs of TNI’s integrated command structure and the nation-wide communication and air defense networks; and the Defense Acquisitions Program that covers nation-wide procurement requirements for communication systems, air defense systems and networks of naval stations and bases, fuel supplies and command structures

            Army’s capability is reinforced by gearing up its central command forces, namely Army’s Strategic Reserves Command (KOSTRAD) and Army’s Special Forces (KOPASSUS), as well as itsterritorial command forces in 12 Regional Military Commands (KODAM)[6].

            The development of posture and structure inside the Navy is projected “to build its capacity to oversee the vast area of Indonesia’s maritime, both on surface and underwater, and to enable it to provide support and compatibility towards the mobility of the army and the air force.” The development and modernizationvof the navy is aimed at fulfilling its requirementvon weaponry systems, including so-called Integrated Fleet Weaponry Systems (SSAT), which consists of Striking Force Units, Patrol Combat Units, and Supporting Combat Units, as well as Marine Armaments.      

            The development of posture and structure inside the air force is built to enable it “to oversee the national aerial space, in particular, and some part of regional aerial space, to improve its capacity above the minimum level in guarding national aerial space, to enable it to utilize the outer space, and to enable it to provide supports in a joint exercise involving the navy and the army[7]. The development and modernization of the air force is aimed at fulfilling its Main Capabilities and Supporting Capabilities, which are comprised of Air Control, Air Strike, Air Transport, Information Utilization, Air Surveillance, Electronic Warfare, Air Refueling, Early Warning and Operation Control Systems, and Special Skills.

Weapon Systems Planning 

            Weapon system can be defines as any integrated system, usually computerized, for the control and operation of weapons of a particular kind. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, and antiballistic missiles are the weaponry of the strategic weapons system. Guided missiles operating at shorter range, e.g., anti-aircraft or battlefield weapons and air-to-air or air-to-surface attack-type missiles, constitute a tactical weapons system.

            Juwono Sudarsono said weapon systems planning is one of the main constituting elements of Dephan’s defense planning process. It aims to support the country’s political and economic objectives and focuses on the development of inter-service (but not common-funded) programs. It does this by promoting cost-effective acquisition, co-operative development and graduated increased local production of weapons systems . It also encourages interoperability, and technological and industrial co-operation among the three services and related ministries and government agencies.

            Dephan’s mandate is to cooperate closely with the Ministry of State Enterprises (Menneg BUMN) which has legal and financial control over five strategic industries: PT Pindad; PT PAL; PT Dana; PT LEN and PT DI; with the Ministry of Industry and the State Ministry for Science and Technology to prepare a long-term plan for developing defense industries which reduces reliance on foreign suppliers; and with the Ministry of Finance for purposes of fiscal accountability

            PT. PINDAD is an Indonesian government owned manufacturing industry specializing in military and commercial products. Its activities cover design, development, engineering and fabrication as well as maintenance. PT Pindad has produced weaponry exclusively for the Indonesian military (TNI) for years. Their main assault rifle is a FN-FNC rippoff aka. the SS1 (V1-V5). Now they have upgraded their program and developed a new rifle for the army. SS2 is a further derivate of FNC, with detachable carry handle, RAS, and a modular design. The SS2-V1 is basically a FNC lower with a new developed upper and barrel.

            Ammunition Division production facilities is to meet the demand of the government and also product development, production facility is equipped with the establishment of Filling Plant to support the production of mortar shells, bombs, TNT blocks, shaped charges and other. 

            in 2011, warheads and missiles will be developed with a proximity fuse fashion.Proximity fuse causing the missile head would explode at a predetermined distance from the target. Proximity fuse technology uses a combination of one or more sensors include radar, active sonar, infrared, magnetic, electrical images. Not only that, PT Pindad also plans to produce Surface to Surface Missiles in 2012.

            Outstanding design capabilities of PT PAL INDONESIA (Persero) has entered the international market and their quality has been acknowledged the world. Ships produced by PT PAL INDONESIA (Persero) has been sailing the waters around the world. Now, PT PAL Indonesia is also able to overhaul Submarine and combat ships. PT Pal also able to build patrol boat and combat ship such as KRI Banjarmasin and etc.
            PT LEN  Industri is a key player in Indonesia’s current military electronics applications and development. From field infantry and mobile tank command communications, to advanced surveillance, targeting, and combat management systems.

            PT LEN able to produce transceiver, combat management system, and transporter torpedo target. Now, PT Len Indonesia produce four more radars in the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan program to cover the Indonesian territories.

            Meanwhile, PT. Dirgantara Indonesia designs, develops, and manufactures civilian and military regional commuter aircraft. Its products and services include airplanes and helicopters, defense systems, parts and components, sub assemblies, and assembly tools and equipment; aircraft services, such as maintenance, overhaul, repair, alteration, aircraft operational lease, and aircraft support services; and engineering services, such as EMC testing, communication, electronic, processing system, and information technology solutions.

Besides from domestic military industries, TNI also buy military equipment from abroad. In 2011, Ministry of Defence  of the Republic of Indonesia certainly buy 16 pieces T50-made fighter jet in South Korea (ROK). One squadron of fighter jets it bought for U.S. $ 400million or around Rp 3, 4 trillion. Meanwhile, the Navy will buy yakhnot missile from Rusia. Yakhnot is an anti-speed supersonic missile which has a cruising range of up to 300 kilometers

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[1] Peter Paret. Military Power, The Journal of Military History. Vol. 53 No.2 P.240

[2] Juwono Sudarsono. Indeonesia Defense Management and Planning. http://juwonosudarsono.com/wordpress/?p=34

[3] Republic of Indonesia Presidential Regulation No. 7 Year 2005

[4] Guy J Pauker. The Indonesian Doctrine of Terrirorial Warfare and Territorial Management. (Santa Monica, RAND, 1963)

[5] Jowono Sudarsono, Op, Cit

[6] Republic of Indonesia Act No.17 year 2007.

[7] Ibid. 

Filosofi Yin-Yang dan Domain Militer-Sipil dalam Demokrasi

Filosofi Yin-Yang dan Domain Militer-Sipil dalam Demokrasi

Ir. Ade Muhammad, M.Han.

Pemerhati Pertahanan dan Keamanan

Sampai saat ini masih belum duduk sebuah pemahaman atas domain sipil dan domain militer dalam sebuah negara demokrasi. Terjadi sebuah fenomena pro kontra terhadap prinsip dwi domain dalam negara ini. Pihak yang kontra bisanya beragumen seharusnya tidak ada sebuah Dikotomi antara militer dan sipil, itu hanyalah masalah profesi saja. Namun sebaliknya yang pro terhadap pemisahan domain dalam negara berargumen bahwa jika tidak dipisahkan, maka akan terjadi sebuah kondisi yang memungkinkan militerisme kembali berkuasa, melalui politisasi militer ujungnya dan terjadi sebuah kondisi negara yang otoriter.
Kita harus memulai dari pemahaman demokrasi. Seperti yang diketahui demokrasi berasal dari kata demos yang artinya Rakyat dan kratos yang artinya Kekuatan. Dimana dikenal prinsipnya yaitu dari rakyat, oleh rakyat dan untuk rakyat. Dari semua embel demokrasi, mana demokrasi yang benar?
Demokrasi yang benar adalah harus mengandung kedaulatan rakyat (people sovereignty). Kedaulatan rakyat adalah rakyat berdaulat melalui empat hal; melalui Pemilu (untuk mencari the best of the best dari rakyat yang pantas jadi pemimpin), Referendum (untuk aspirasi kewilayahan dan aspirasi publik terhadap nasib RUU yang akan berlaku), Konsensus (kesepakatan publik, misalnya Merdeka atau mati, Tritura atau Reformasi) dan Opini Publik (suara rakyat langsung melalui dijaminnya pers yang bebas). Tanpa mekanisme kedaulatan rakyat, atau mekanismenya masih dipelintir, maka rakyat tidak akan berkuasa dan otomatis kondisi demokrasi juga tidak ada.
Dalam demokrasi itu terdapat domain yang spesifik. Domain sendiri artinya wewenang atau wilayah. Kemudian domain domain ini dikenal dengan domain militer  dan domain sipil. Untuk memahami bagaimana keduanya, dalam buku Arsitektur Konstitusi Bernegara tahun 2007 oleh Hendarmin Ranadireksa dengan sangat menarik dijelaskan melalui filsafat cina kuno yaitu filsafat Yin Yang.
Filsafat Yin Yang adalah dua karakter yang saling bertolak belakang namun saling membutuhkan dalam sebuah entitas, saling interkoneksi dalam perbedaan dan harmoni namun dua karakter ini tidak lebur. Yin adalah perlambang dari feminintas, bulan atau gelap dengan sifat kelembutan, deep thinking, lamban, dingin, ketenangan dan basah atau subur. Sementara Yang adalah kebalikannya, dengan perlambangan maskulinitas, terang dengan sifat keras, quick thinking, cepat, panas, bergelora dan kering.
Dalam negara demokrasi Domain militer (Yang) mempunyai pemahaman yang sangat khas berbeda dan spesifik daripada Domain sipil (Yin).
Domain Militer bertentangan dengan Domain Sipil dengan prinsip prinsip Top Down vs Bottom Up, tunduk pada komando vs tunduk pada hukum, seragam vs beragam, butuh kepastian vs butuh perdebatan, bersenjata vs tidak bersenjata, temporer vs permanen, darurat vs aman, orientasi instant vs butuh waktu proses dsb. Namun negara membutuhkan keduanya untuk dapat menjalankan fungsinya tentunya dalam sebuah harmoni. Masalahnya adalah pada saat kapan kita membutuhkan militer dan saat kapan kita membutuhkan sipil.
Militer adalah institusi satu satunya yang didesain untuk menangani kondisi negara yang abnormal. Baik itu karena perang, bencana atau kerusuhan politik dimana institusi sipil sudah tidak efektif lagi. Tujuannya adalah mengambil alih kondisi abnormal untuk sesegera mungkin di pulihkan menjadi kondisi normal, untuk kemudian diambil alih oleh sipil kembali. Institusi militer mempunyai 5 sistem yang mampu digelar seketika untuk menghadapi kondisi abnormal tersebut, sistem persenjataan, logistik, kesehatan, transportasi dan telekomunikasi.
Untuk itu ciri khas dari keluarnya militer bertugas adalah dengan sebuah Maklumat Darurat Militer oleh Kepala Negara, dimana saat itu berlaku sebuah kondisi darurat dalam payung hukum darurat militer. Ciri khas berikutnya adalah Operasi Darurat Militer haruslah dalam tempo yang sangat singkat, cukup dalam hitungan jam atau hari saja. Sebelum dikembalikan ke otoritas sipil kembali. Ini untuk menghindari ekses negatif dari operasi militer.
Dalam konteks ke Indonesiaan, masih banyak semacam kebingungan untuk membedakan domain militer dan sipil dalam sebuah fungsi negara. Meminjam istilah dari ahli hukum lulusan Sorborne, Perancis Tisnaya Kusumah yaitu kondisi yang Imbroglio atau multikhaotik.
Misalnya ketika fungsi sipil dalam suatu negara, seperti penegakan hukum yang institusi institusinya harus tunduk pada hukum, ketika dimasukkan karakter domain militer, maka institusi tersebut tidak akan tunduk pada hukum, melainkan tunduk pada atasannya. Sehingga terjadi abused of power. Sehingga jika terjadi pelanggaran hukum, maka dimungkinkan sang penjahat untuk “cing cay” dengan membayar atasan penegak hukum yang nantinya akan memberikan perintah penghentian penyidikan atau hukuman yang lebih ringan.
Atau sebaliknya, dalam sebuah negara, fungsi domain militer yang terjangkiti “sipilisasi”. Misalnya tidak adanya keseragaman dalam militer, semua berstandar berbeda antara unit bahkan angkatan. Mulai dari seragam loreng, kaliber peluru sampai kendaraan. Ini akan terjadi kekacauan dalam logistik. Kemudian militer malah sibuk berbisnis. Ini tentunya sudah keluar dari karakter domain militer.
Contoh terakhir adalah fenomena protes seorang kolonel TNI AU pada Kepala Negara sekaligus Panglima Tertingginya. Dari prinsip domain militer yang Top Down sudah melanggar prinsip bermiliter. Sehingga harus diambil tindakan yang tegas sesuai hukum militer yang berlaku dalam domain militer.
Etikanya jika seorang personel militer tidak cocok dengan institusi atau atasan, dia harus keluar dulu dari Domain Militer. Setelah masuk Domain Sipil yang Bottom Up, maka personel ini dapat dengan aman menyalurkan apapun aspirasinya. Seperti contoh kasus Letkol (purn) Juanda dari TNI AL.
Demikian tulisan ini semoga bermanfaat.