Indonesia Defense Management

Indonesia Defense Management

(Part I)

By David Raja Marpaung S.IP, M.Def

            I will separate the article to be two part. The first part will discuss first three element of defense management that consists of force planning, resource planning, and weapon system planning. In other article, will observe the supporting streams, that consist with logistics, C4SRI (command, control, communication computer, surveillance, reconnaissance, information), and civil emergency.

            Military force in a certain country is built to defend the endurance of the state towards other military threats launched by foreign country. According to Peter Paret, military force is an implemented expression of national power applied through the deployment and employment of armed forces[1]. In order to make sure the development and sustainability of military forces, the government especially ministry of defense needs to make defense planning and management.

            Defense planning and management is a comprehensive endeavor that encompasses six different areas. There are three core areas: force, resource and weapon systems planning; and three supporting streams: logistics, C4SRI (command, control, communication computer, surveillance, reconnaissance, information), and civil emergency.

Force Planning

            Force Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. Ensuring that a modern military has the appropriate personnel and capabilities is the key goal of military force planning It is primarily the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services and is conducted under the administrative control that runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments and Services.

            Former Indonesia Defense Ministry Juwono Sudarsono Said Force planning deals specifically with providing Indonesia with the forces and capabilities of the tri-services to execute their range of missions, in accordance with the Indonesia doctrine of total defence and security (sishankamrata). It seeks to ensure that Indonesia develop sustainable and interoperable forces, which can function even with limited or scarce budgetary resources[2]. 

            The force planning process is based on three sequential elements: general political guidance, planning targets and defense reviews. Political guidance sets out the overall aims to be met, incorporating President S.B. Yudhoyono’s concept of Minimum Essential Force (MEF) that establishes in military terms the number, scale and nature of operational readiness and force structure that the country as a whole should at a minimum be able to deploy. 

            Planning targets include both a detailed determination of an integrated tri-service force (Tri-Matra Terpadu) requirements and the setting of implementation targets to fulfill those requirements. Defense reviews provide a means to assess the degree to which planning targets are being met. The term ‘force planning’ is often confused with that of ‘defense planning’, which is much broader (includes non-military defense planning), and that of ‘operational planning’, which is conducted for specific, tactical and command-level military operations, including balancing strike force, support and maintenance/repair capabilities. 

            But then several question comes up related with these concept, especially Minimum essential Force (MEF). Ministry of Defence has planned to transform the current defence posture by using conceptual framework of Minimum Essential Forces (MEF). This concept will bridge the transition process prior to the development of new defence posture compatible with the concept of policy and strategy on national defence. Indonesian government introduces the MEF-styled concept in its Mid-Term National Development Plan of the Year of 2004-2009[3].

            The problem is there is no definitely definition about MEF. According to the Ministry of Defense version; the minimum essential force is the minimum of the defense forces are capable of causing prevent impact. And minimum essential force emphasis on capability-based planning. That is, there are a number of capabilities designed capable implemented by these forces. The MEF-styled defense concept is rooted in “capability-base approach”. Thus, the government should combine such approach with “task-oriented approach” to ensure that the TNI always has high-qualified striking force to launch unexpected short-term military operations. The task-oriented approach is a followup towards assertive-approach and territorial control that become the basic concept for military deployment in strategic compartments[4]

.           The Question is how much or how many is the minimum forces to prevent threat?.   With MEF, Indonesia armed forces will be directed to preventing the war but not winning the war.  Compare with US Maritime Strategic “preventing the war as equal as winning the war”.

            It is true that the birth of the concept of minimum essential force could not be separated with economic consideration. But we must realistic with calculation of the amount of force that needed to secure our archipelago. For example, do we have enough maritime force (124 combat ships, and 74 airplane ) to cover all our territory.

Resources Planning

            Resources Planning can be define as detail summary of all types of resources (equipment, human, finance, time, etc) that required to complete a specific task such as military transformation, defense development, and etc. Reasonable framework to assess the effectiveness of the state to build its defense force must be correlated to the capacity of the state to convert its national resources to become a coercive tool.

            Juwono Sudarsono  Said National resources comprise human resources, natural resources and man-made resources. National resource planning aims to provide the country with the capabilities it needs, but focuses on the elements that are joined in common funding; each service pool resources within a nation-wide total defense framework[5].

            Resource planning is closely linked to operational planning, which aims to ensure that the Indonesian Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) fulfill its present and minimum operational commitments and face new threats such as terrorism and bio-chemical weapons. There is a distinction between joint funding and common funding: joint funding covers activities, managed by the Ministry of Defense (Dephan) and TNI Headquarters (Mabes TNI), such as integrated acquisitions and procurement of common use items.

            Common funding involves three different budgets: the civil budget, which covers the running costs of Dephan and Mabes TNI; the military budget, which essentially covers the running costs of TNI’s integrated command structure and the nation-wide communication and air defense networks; and the Defense Acquisitions Program that covers nation-wide procurement requirements for communication systems, air defense systems and networks of naval stations and bases, fuel supplies and command structures

            Army’s capability is reinforced by gearing up its central command forces, namely Army’s Strategic Reserves Command (KOSTRAD) and Army’s Special Forces (KOPASSUS), as well as itsterritorial command forces in 12 Regional Military Commands (KODAM)[6].

            The development of posture and structure inside the Navy is projected “to build its capacity to oversee the vast area of Indonesia’s maritime, both on surface and underwater, and to enable it to provide support and compatibility towards the mobility of the army and the air force.” The development and modernizationvof the navy is aimed at fulfilling its requirementvon weaponry systems, including so-called Integrated Fleet Weaponry Systems (SSAT), which consists of Striking Force Units, Patrol Combat Units, and Supporting Combat Units, as well as Marine Armaments.      

            The development of posture and structure inside the air force is built to enable it “to oversee the national aerial space, in particular, and some part of regional aerial space, to improve its capacity above the minimum level in guarding national aerial space, to enable it to utilize the outer space, and to enable it to provide supports in a joint exercise involving the navy and the army[7]. The development and modernization of the air force is aimed at fulfilling its Main Capabilities and Supporting Capabilities, which are comprised of Air Control, Air Strike, Air Transport, Information Utilization, Air Surveillance, Electronic Warfare, Air Refueling, Early Warning and Operation Control Systems, and Special Skills.

Weapon Systems Planning 

            Weapon system can be defines as any integrated system, usually computerized, for the control and operation of weapons of a particular kind. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, and antiballistic missiles are the weaponry of the strategic weapons system. Guided missiles operating at shorter range, e.g., anti-aircraft or battlefield weapons and air-to-air or air-to-surface attack-type missiles, constitute a tactical weapons system.

            Juwono Sudarsono said weapon systems planning is one of the main constituting elements of Dephan’s defense planning process. It aims to support the country’s political and economic objectives and focuses on the development of inter-service (but not common-funded) programs. It does this by promoting cost-effective acquisition, co-operative development and graduated increased local production of weapons systems . It also encourages interoperability, and technological and industrial co-operation among the three services and related ministries and government agencies.

            Dephan’s mandate is to cooperate closely with the Ministry of State Enterprises (Menneg BUMN) which has legal and financial control over five strategic industries: PT Pindad; PT PAL; PT Dana; PT LEN and PT DI; with the Ministry of Industry and the State Ministry for Science and Technology to prepare a long-term plan for developing defense industries which reduces reliance on foreign suppliers; and with the Ministry of Finance for purposes of fiscal accountability

            PT. PINDAD is an Indonesian government owned manufacturing industry specializing in military and commercial products. Its activities cover design, development, engineering and fabrication as well as maintenance. PT Pindad has produced weaponry exclusively for the Indonesian military (TNI) for years. Their main assault rifle is a FN-FNC rippoff aka. the SS1 (V1-V5). Now they have upgraded their program and developed a new rifle for the army. SS2 is a further derivate of FNC, with detachable carry handle, RAS, and a modular design. The SS2-V1 is basically a FNC lower with a new developed upper and barrel.

            Ammunition Division production facilities is to meet the demand of the government and also product development, production facility is equipped with the establishment of Filling Plant to support the production of mortar shells, bombs, TNT blocks, shaped charges and other. 

            in 2011, warheads and missiles will be developed with a proximity fuse fashion.Proximity fuse causing the missile head would explode at a predetermined distance from the target. Proximity fuse technology uses a combination of one or more sensors include radar, active sonar, infrared, magnetic, electrical images. Not only that, PT Pindad also plans to produce Surface to Surface Missiles in 2012.

            Outstanding design capabilities of PT PAL INDONESIA (Persero) has entered the international market and their quality has been acknowledged the world. Ships produced by PT PAL INDONESIA (Persero) has been sailing the waters around the world. Now, PT PAL Indonesia is also able to overhaul Submarine and combat ships. PT Pal also able to build patrol boat and combat ship such as KRI Banjarmasin and etc.
            PT LEN  Industri is a key player in Indonesia’s current military electronics applications and development. From field infantry and mobile tank command communications, to advanced surveillance, targeting, and combat management systems.

            PT LEN able to produce transceiver, combat management system, and transporter torpedo target. Now, PT Len Indonesia produce four more radars in the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan program to cover the Indonesian territories.

            Meanwhile, PT. Dirgantara Indonesia designs, develops, and manufactures civilian and military regional commuter aircraft. Its products and services include airplanes and helicopters, defense systems, parts and components, sub assemblies, and assembly tools and equipment; aircraft services, such as maintenance, overhaul, repair, alteration, aircraft operational lease, and aircraft support services; and engineering services, such as EMC testing, communication, electronic, processing system, and information technology solutions.

Besides from domestic military industries, TNI also buy military equipment from abroad. In 2011, Ministry of Defence  of the Republic of Indonesia certainly buy 16 pieces T50-made fighter jet in South Korea (ROK). One squadron of fighter jets it bought for U.S. $ 400million or around Rp 3, 4 trillion. Meanwhile, the Navy will buy yakhnot missile from Rusia. Yakhnot is an anti-speed supersonic missile which has a cruising range of up to 300 kilometers

---

[1] Peter Paret. Military Power, The Journal of Military History. Vol. 53 No.2 P.240

[2] Juwono Sudarsono. Indeonesia Defense Management and Planning. http://juwonosudarsono.com/wordpress/?p=34

[3] Republic of Indonesia Presidential Regulation No. 7 Year 2005

[4] Guy J Pauker. The Indonesian Doctrine of Terrirorial Warfare and Territorial Management. (Santa Monica, RAND, 1963)

[5] Jowono Sudarsono, Op, Cit

[6] Republic of Indonesia Act No.17 year 2007.

[7] Ibid. 

Impact of Somali Pirates and Role of United Nation

Impact of  Somali Pirates and Role of United Nation

By David Raja Marpaung S.IP M.Def

Background

            Piracy off the coast of Somalia has its roots in, among other factors, state failure, encroachment of Somali waters and the poor living conditions of the Somali population. A better understanding of this phenomenon requires a brief historical perspective. Before the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia received aid from countries such as Denmark, Great Britain, Iraq, Japan, Sweden, the former Soviet Union and West Germany to develop its fishing industry, mainly for export since there was a low demand for seafood in Somalia[1] The collapse of Somalia’s central state, however, created instability and security problems that undermined legitimate forms of production, including the fishing industry. Foreign trawlers reportedly using prohibited fishing equipment such as small mesh nets and sophisticated underwater lighting systems then started encroaching on the waters of Somalia[2]. With time, Somalia’s unpatrolled waters also became a cost-free dumping ground for industrial toxic waste. This was evident when the 2005 tsunami washed up barrels of hazardous waste products onto the shores of Somalia, which, according to a United Nations report. After that,  Piracy became the fastest and sometimes only way for young males to secure livelihoods and enhance their social status. This criminal activity has since evolved not only in terms of magnitude but also in sophistication. It has grown into a multimillion-dollar industry, with gunmen demanding huge ransoms for the ships they seize. Piracy has also shifted away from its initial concentration around the port of Mogadishu to areas outside the Somaliwaters, extending into the Gulf of Aden and downwards towards the exclusive economic zone of the Seychelles.

            Piracy off the coast of Somalia is growing at an alarming rate and threatens to drastically disrupt international trade. Beyond the immediate threat that maritime piracy poses to crews, property, and ships, it endangers sea lines of communication, interferes with freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, and undermines regional stability by providing funds that feed the vicious war in Somalia. Political and social development is corroded by piracy in Africa, disrupting capital formation and economic development, fuelling corruption, and empowering private armies. Pirates have progressively increased their capacity by abandoning their little boats for full-fledged cargo boats, and by using AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades instead of small weapons. They also now use global positioning systems (GPS) and satellite phones, and it is suggested that they are plugged into an international network that feeds them with information from ports in the Gulf, Europe and Asia.

Economic Impact Of Somali Pirate

            United Nations report noted that the looting of Somali pirate activity is expanding, resulting in losses of more than a year the world's 7.0 billion. The report calls on countries to strengthen maritime security and the establishment of the pirates to court.[3] Since 2008, Somali pirates have captured nearly 2,000 people, and received $ 9,500,000 ransom. According to United Nations figures, as of December 31 last year, there are 26 boats and 612 people in their hands. It is reported, the report estimated loss of $ 7,000,000,000, including the military expenditure, loss of value of the goods, the ransom and higher insurance premiums. currently a total of 780 pirates were detained by the navy in 13 countries. However, the 10 were arrested at sea pirates, there are 9 will be released on the spot, because there is no place to judge them.

            The proliferation of piracy in Somalia has substantial international trade implications. Approximately 16,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden each year on their way to the Suez Canal in Egypt, transporting myriad Asian goods and oil from the Persian Gulf region to Europe and North America. The threat of piracy has exponentially increased the cost of travel along this route. Expectedly, ransom payments and lost travel time escalate costs on hijacked vessels. All ships, however, incur increased costs in the form of higher insurance premiums. War risk premiums must now be paid on ships traveling through the Gulf of Aden, which has increased premiums tenfold over the past year. If premiums continue to rise, companies may have to take longer, more costly routes to reach Europe and North America. One possible alternative is traveling around the Cape of Good Hope, a journey that takes several extra weeks of fuel consumption and travel time. These increased expenses translate into higher commodity price for a variety of goods, including oil. In a world already damaged by the recent surges in energy costs, continued price increases pose a serious threat to international commerce and development.[4]

Regional Impact

The rise of piracy in 2008 , where more than 90 cases were reported, has severely impacted the security of the Red Sea being a strategic water passage. With the rise in risks of navigation in the region, many countries  began to use alternative routes such as the Cape of Good Hope, even though it is more costly to do so. The risks that are imposed by piracy are: the weakening of the economies that benefit from the Red Sea trade routes; the potential that the Red Sea region could transform into a battle field where other countries impose themselves politically and drug dealing could blossom under such chaotic circumstances; the transforming of the Red Sea into an international water passage, which would reap out the benefits of the benefiting regional countries; and finally fears that Israel and its allies would dominate the region under the banner of “war on terror” and reshape it as proposed by the “Greater Middle East” plan.

Yemen is one of the first countries to recognize the threat imposed by piracy. As early as 1977, it held a conference for all Arab countries to discuss the security of the Red Sea region. However, due to the global political situation at the time –the Cold War, and the Arab-Israeli War- the agenda was put aside and received little attention. Yemen, however, continued to press on the subjects, especially after the collapse of the Somali government and the political turmoil that took place in East Africa. Thus, with the rise in piracy by 2007, the already fragile Somali economy had suffered msever consequences.

As for Egypt, it has sustained direct repercussions as a result of piracy, which endangered Egyptian vessels and impacted negatively on shipping through the Suez Canal. Equally important, however, are the negative ramifications on Egypt's national security. Thus the whole situation requires swift actions on the part of Egypt so as to preserve its interests. Cairo could move in cooperation with other countries or international organizations with which it shares worries over the security of the region, or it could act unilaterally if collective action proves wasteful or unworthy.

Currently, safeguarding shipping through the Red Sea and nearby areas is an Egyptian top priority. Piracy could lead to the diminishing of revenue gained by Egyptian coffers off the Suez Canal, which make up one of the largest foreign currency income sources for Egypt. Revenues from the Suez Canal fell from $469.6 million in September to $467.5 million in October to $419.8 million in November. According to experts, revenues will dramatically decrease should the problem of piracy remain unresolved. 

With the persistence of this problem, an international coalition of forces was formed to battle this crisis. This coalition of forces was led by the US, France, and other Western countries. The security council has passed a legislation that allowed for military presence of Western countries in Somali waters. The fear of turning the Red Sea into an international water passage has sparked alarms in the neighboring countries. It is widely thought that the United State’s and EU’s presence in Somalia is primarily to internationalize the southern entrance to the Red Sea and the gulf of Aden. The greater objective however, is sought to be internationalizing the Suez Canal. An action that threatens both Egypt’s national security and that of the Arab world as well.   

The Role Of United Nation

United Nation  should play a big role to solve the Somali Pirates. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the main organs of the United Nations. It's the muscle wing of the UN organisation, its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, enforcing multinational sanctions and deployment of military interventions. There are fifteen countries in the Security Council, but only five of them are the so called Permanent Representatives to the Security Council.

The UNSC's role in international collective security is defined by the UN Charter, which gives the Security Council the power to:

• Investigate any situation threatening international peace;

• Recommend procedures for peaceful resolution of a dispute;

• Call upon other member nations to completely or partially interrupt economic relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to sever diplomatic relations;

• Enforce its decisions militarily, or by any means necessary;

• Avoid conflict and maintain focus on cooperation.

So on the Issue of Somali Piracy, it falls to the UNSC to utilise it's power and rights to resolve peacefully and diplomatically, or to take necessary actions against involved parties

Today's model and structure clearly make it slow and not so effective. But this is a process. Today’s crisis with maritime piracy should be solved now.

What kind of action is useful to be taken[5]:

1. Adoption of a Resolution of the UNSC, as a continuation of the so far adopted ones – to conduct peace support operations around the Gulf of Aden and North-Western part of the Indian Ocean, together with specialized combat units of NATO (after coordination and contacting) and with participation (resources) of other states interested in solving the problem and specialized international organizations, under UN command;

2. Adoption of a resolution of the UNSC, which allows for declaring of "naval blockade" according to Art. 42 of UN Chapter of the Ports, who sheltered combat units of pirates and captured ships and crews;

3. Implementing limited "coercive measures" under Chapter VII of UN Charter to Ports used for "base" of sea pirates, like Ale and others along the coast of Somalia;

4. To be conducted intensive diplomatic contacts by the United Nations with the African Union and the Administration of Senegal, presented at the UN, asking for full cooperation and unconditional assistance and in accordance with Art. 43 of UN Charter;

5. International commercial shipping organizations, insurers and P & I Clubs to build funds to collect funds to combat sea-piracy, which could be available for goals by UN operations in this connection, thereby alleviating the Organization budget;

6. International organizations and countries that have information satellites in Earth orbit, passing over the areas of maritime pirates to provide a photo and related information about the coordinates of pirates and the hijacked vessels;

---

[1] US Department of Commerce, NOAA, NMFS Scientific Publications Office ‘Somali fishery industry has potential for growth’, Marine Fisheries Review, 44, 12, 1982, pp. 25-28.

[2] Knaup H ‘Prelude to piracy: The poor fishermen of Somalia’, Spiegel Online International

[3] http://www.china-daily.org/International-News/Somali-pirates-have-caused-an-annual-loss-of-7.0-billion-revenue-global-ransom-by-Detector/

[4] http://africaecon.org/index.php/exclusives/read_exclusive/1/1

[5] Anton Antonov. http://eurobalkanconsult.com/assets/files/file/22%2010%202010%20Somali%20pirates%20case.pdf