Showing posts with label counter terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label counter terrorism. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 7, 2011

Hawala System a Financing Strategy of Global Terrorism

Hawala System a Financing Strategy of Global Terrorism
by Ir. Ade Muhammad, M.Han


Introduction
For money is the oxygen of terrorism. Without the means to raise and move money around the world terrorists cannot function” ( Collin Powell, US. Secretary of State)[1].

On May 1st 2011, secret operation named Operation Neptune Spear of elite US Navy Seal Team VI (and some sources report also with Delta Force) has conducted to take the Geronimo or known as no 1 Terrorist Osama Bin Laden in Bilal Town, Abotabad, in Pakistan territory. this Operation were noted as a major success of Global War on Terror since 9/11. 
Even so, the Al Qaeda still exist and still having controlled of their financial resources network. 
The focuses of this paper are trying to study and analyze the financial strategy of terrorist in Southeast Asia.
Money, we all needs money including the terrorist groups to fund its organization as well their operation.  We are focusing the study of Al Qaeda correlating to Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia in funding aspect.
And this vital study are very imminent because the nature and the difficulties of tracking it. For instances, United States under Executive Order 13244 in January 2003, as of September 2003, only $136.7 million in Al Qaeda-linked assets had been frozen[2]. Meanwhile estimated “total transaction” in Al Qaeda network US$ 30,000,000 per year[3].
We trying coverage about system of funding, the correlation between hierarchy of the group with the spending, overall system of raising fund, the subsystem of the raising fund, the discipline of storing and flowing the funding, the conclusion and in the end our recommendation. We present this paper with graphics and will be presented also in graphic based presentation. We hope that makes us easier to comprehend this issue.

Why they need money ?
They need funding to run the organization and the operation or mission. The needs for money could be categorized in the cost pyramid.
The organizational cost are include to finance; (see figure 1) maintain cells/enlarge cells, maintain infrastructure, training & travel, build false identities & procure false documentation, settle the safe houses, provide job/salaries (social cost), support families / relatives of prisoners (shahids).

the operational cost include; planning, preparation of the operation (making bomb, IED etc) and the operation.
But there are other hypotheses, from the comprehensive understanding that the terror funding not only used in “the terror domain” but also used in the 3 overlap domain. The Political Domain, Education Domain (such as suspected rouged pesantren) and “Military Operation”Domain (Terror Ops). This hypothesis is known as “Integrated Teamwork of Islamic Fundamentalist” (see figure 2).[4]




The hierarchy of the group correlated with spending/asset
On the tip of the pyramid of terror has shown the great of “cost” and asset. Estimated by the CIA about US $ 30 million per year to sustain all its operation before 9/11[1].  The operation it self not contribute a lot’s of money, for instance for 9/11 “show” the cost of plan and conducting, only between US $ 400,000- 500,000 (see figure 3).
Meanwhile the cost needed related to lower hierarchy such as Jema’ah Islamiyah getting cheaper. Hambali the head of JI operation, known possessed about US $ 500,000 and JI in Indonesia received some Rp1.35 billion from Al Qaeda since 1996[2]. And to running the Bomb Bali the JI only require no more than US $ 50,000.[3]
The lower group who inspired by Al Qaeda, are lower than that. Even though there was no report so far on their action, but the scholar, intelligences community and the international strongly believe their exist. As matter of time and opportunity for the Al Qaeda wannabe to show their fangs.


The System of Raising Fund


Mainly there are 4 entry point for the raising fund into the islamic terrorist group (see figure 4).
The sponsor. The state such as Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea or used to be Libya[1]. In the middle east, many organization got their funding from country through out the history. From Black September, Fatah to present HAMAS and Hezbollah had been received huge amount of fund from these sponsor countries. But now in the Southeast Asian case, this could be rare for Islamic Terrorist Group.   
The charity. This is correlated to Islamic tradition and law. Muslims are expected to donate 2.5 per cent of their net revenue to charity, known as zakat and the other charity from the member to the organization known as infaq.
 "In many communities, the zakat is often provided in cash to prominent, trusted community leaders or institutions, who then commingle and disperse the donated moneys to persons and charities they determine to be worthy." This practice is unregulated, unaudited, and thus leads to terrible abuse by groups such as Al Qaeda. There are some 300 private charities in Saudi Arabia alone, including 20 established by Saudi intelligence to fund the Afghan Mujiheddin that send upwards of US$6 billion a year to Islamic causes abroad. It is estimated that US$1.6 million per day is donated by wealthy Saudis alone. The four most important Saudi charities are the Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO), which is part of the Muslim World League, a fully Saudi state-funded organization whose assets were frozen by the U.S. Treasury; the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, also based in Saudi Arabia; Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MERC); and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The President of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth is Sheikh Saleh al-Sheikh, the Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs. More disturbing, a Canadian intelligence report concluded that Saudi charities alone were funnelling between US$1--2 million annually to Al Qaeda's coffers[2]
The contribution. Specially, in the case of Middle East in the era before ‘90, the fund used to be received by the various company contribution (company not own by them, based on the symphaty for the cause). But now it is very difficult for one legitimate company to openly contribute the terrorist organization. But the contribution by individual remain active under zakat and infaq system. In Indonesian case of JI related to the religious conflict of Ambon, the contribution from Chinesse company were successfully collected through their fund raising campaign (Chinesse community in Indonesia, fear Radical Islam groups)[3], in various big city in Indonesia. Eventhough not clear about the amount they managed to collect.
The business. There are two ways, legal or illegal business. For legal business, not only expected to become the legal “cash engine”, but also to be able to purchase material needed for the organization and their operation. The good example of that company start by Konsojaya. Established in 1994, was a trading company that ostensibly exported Malaysian palm oil to Afghanistan and imported honey from Sudan and Yemen. The firm was capitalized with 100,000 ringgit, and 5,998 of its 6,000 shares were controlled by Wali Khan Amin Shah and Medhat Abdul Salam Shabana. Konsojaya’s original board of directors also included Hambali and his wife, Noralwizah Lee Binti Abdullah (a subsequent five-member board did not include Hambali or his wife). The company played an important role in Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s Oplan Bojinka as a front for moving money and purchasing chemicals and equipment for bomb-making. Ramzi Yousef and Wali Khan Amin  Shah established another shell company, the Bermuda Trading Company, in 1994 as a cover to import chemicals for bomb-making. Then also Infocus Technology was established in July 1995, also by Yazid Sufaat. The company was partially owned by his wife. Infocus Technology hired Zacarias Moussaoui, alleged to be the 20th September 11 hijacker, as a marketing consultant and was able to get him a visa to the United States. Infocus was to have paid Moussaoui a lump sum of $35,000 and a monthly stipend of $2,500 to cover his flight training in the United States. Sufaat has told Malaysian investigators that the money was never actually paid, but there is no evidence that this is the case.
Another front company was Secure Valley, established in October 1996. Little is known about the purpose or operations of this general trading company, but it had many of the same boards of directors as the other three JI-linked firms.
In addition to these, there were several other JI-linked front companies. Zulkifli (Zulkepli) Marzuki, according to Canadian intelligence, owned a security company in Kuala Lumpur called MNZ Associates (sometimes referred to as MNZ Management Services) in which many key meetings took place.104 Zulkifli co-owned MNZ with Mohamad Nasir Ismail, who was arrested in January 2002 under Malaysia’s Internal Security Act. Marzuki was a trained accountant, and MNZ Associates did the auditing for most JI/Al Qaeda front companies in Malaysia, including Infocus Technology and Green Laboratory Medicine. (MNZ Associates changed hands in January 2003 and is now named Wan Ali Jaafar Associates.) [4].
The illegal business of Islamic Terrorist Group including ; Opium farm in the Opium Belt at Afghanistan,  correlated with arm trading and smugglings (Narco-Terrorism), Hawala System (Informal Value Transfer System/ Alternative Remittance System) and  Internet Scams.
Works of Hawala System: basically an underground banking system and personal couriers (carrying cash, gold, or gems) to transfer funds across borders almost without trace. Like the principle if we transfer money through Money Gram to for instances our friend in US. We give our money to Money Gram Indonesia, then Money Gram US will pay our friend with their money first. Later on MG US will charge MG Indonesia with bill, and MG Indonesia will settle the payment through payment. The differences is in the Hawala system all payment made in cash through money man or courier. Other modus operandi is for using the fake transaction. In the diagram shown very clearly about this modus operandi[5].


The advantage of Hawala system are :
·                     Faster and cheaper than conventional banking system.
·                     Function at all level of money laundering – placement, layering and integration.
·                     No need to open bank account – no paper trail
·                     Serves remote location in Asia
·                     Reliable and secure – receipts usually no names.



That’s the basic system and to operate to transfer fund they follow the next procedure.
In the figure 6. Hawala System – Under pricing shown that, if Al Qaeda in Afganistan would like to send the money to JI network in Indonesia let say US$ 100,000.
  1. Al Qaeda give the money to Hawalar in Pakistan US$ 100,000
  2. Hawalar Pakistan will purchase a saleable goods such as Computer, valued US$ 150,000
  3. After purchased, Hawalar Pakistan will export this Computer to Indonesia with the Declared invoice US$ 50,000
  4. Hawalar Indonesia will received this Computer package and sells it for normal price US $ 150,000
after that Hawalar Indonesia split the Money, first give Indonesian JI US$ 100,000 and then send back “payment” to Pakistan of US$ 50,000.


Then the figure 7. Hawala System – overvoicing is if the situation other wise. If the JI would like to send Al Qaeda money, let say US $ 100,000 but the Hawalar Pakistan still need to export to Indonesia (to maintain the consistency of cover business).
  1. First JI give Hawalar Indonesia the money US $ 100,000.
  2. Then Hawalar Indonesia request to Hawalar Pakistan to import “Computer” to Indonesia. Hawalar Pakistan will purchase Computer in the value of US$ 50,000
  3. Then Computer will be shipped to Indonesia and Declared invoice of US$ 150,000
  4. Hawala Indonesia receives the Computer and sells it for US$ 50,000. then send the money US$ 150,000 to Hawala Pakistan.
After received the money, Hawala split the money, US$ 50,000 as their original money and US$ 100,000 to Al Qaeda.

Fund discipline of the terrorist group
Basically they used two method first using money laundry techniques and second they always flow by cash. To hide from the authority’s detection in the financial system.
Money Laundry and Reverse Money Laundry. When they got the profit from the illegal business sources such as opium or smuggling, they have to make that money innocent in the eyes of financial system. They have to laundry that “dirty money” to become “clean money”.
The techniques of laundry money start from the placement to the fund manager. Then the fund manager will do the layering process (example : store money in the bank and borrow the money from the bank, and do it again the process or playing in the stock market with several different names etc) after the layering process, then the integration. To integrate the money that already has been clean by the process. Then the money in that new place are the clean money ready to use. This could be done in the opposite way.
Flow by cash not transfer. According to regional intelligence officials, that year, the JI received Rp250 million, Rp400 million in 1997 and Rp700 million in 2000 (roughly US$40,000 and US$70,000 respectively). Omar al-Faruq testified to transferring US$200,000 to the JI's Indonesian cell after 2000.
Sheik Abu Abdullah al-Emarati, an alias of Osama bin Laden, was also involved in funding JI operations. He purportedly gave US$74,000 to Omar al-Faruq to purchase three tons of explosives for JI operations. The Bali attack likewise was funded by US$35,000 transferred by Wan Min Wan Mat, believed to be an important JI treasurer in Malaysia, to Mukhlas and Imam Samudra, the leading perpetrators in the Bali bombings.
A Jordanian man, Hadi Yousef al-Ghoul was arrested in his home west of Manila, Philippines, on 27 December 2001. Police officials contended that "Al-Ghoul is a member of one of the terrorist cells in the Philippines assigned to carry out a string of bombings in Metro Manila", but more importantly, he was seen as a mid-level Al Qaeda money man, who provided cash to locally-based Jemaah Islamiya operatives to whom he was believed to be financially supporting.
Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Canadian-Kuwaiti Al Qaeda operative, was dispatched to Southeast Asia in 2001 with some US$10,000 in seed money provided by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Al Qaeda's chief of operations. To conduct operations against U.S. targets in Singapore and Manila, Jabarah was given US$30,000 in three US$10,000 instalments in November 2001 from a man he identified as Al Qaeda's main money man in Malaysia. Jabarah was the primary conduit for Al Qaeda funds to Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, the head of JI operations in the Philippines, who was responsible for purchasing TNT for operations in Manila and Singapore. When Jabarah left Singapore for Kuala Lumpur and later Thailand when he was on the run, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service interrogation report states that he relied on infusions of cash from Al Qaeda operatives based in the region.

Conclusion of the analysis
This task could be the hardest part in Counterterrorism. Because the logistic and money supply still flowing until now, with few little success to freeze those money. So far it is very difficult to detect and most likely impossible to shut down.
This black funding phenomenon grows very good in the corrupt country such as Indonesia. Another challenge also in the weak linkage between the interagency network in Indonesia (not integrated) and other agency in Southeast Asia. 

Recomendation
The sun is the best disinfectant” (Winston Churchill)
Unity makes us strong, disintegrate makes us weak” (Indonesian credo on United in Difference).
Those two philosophies would be the best answer available to this critical phenomenon.
We need more transparency; every thing in “black” and “dark” area should be open to public. Any suspicious action will be emerged easily with the transparency principle.
Counterterrorism would need integrated work, strong interagency coordination from the intelligence unit to the custom. The close relationship between states in Southeast Asia would be the best manner to deal with this clear and present danger.
Only with two principles, the threat would be likely detect earlier and easier to counter or maybe if we lucky enough, to launch preemptive-strike against the network of terror. 




[1] State Sponsor of Terrorism, US Departement of State, released by the office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 26th 2006
[2] Funding terrorism in Southeast Asia: the financial network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya. http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-3159694/Funding-terrorism-in-Southeast-Asia.html
[3] Personal communication, Ade Muhammad by the various source of Indonesian Chinesse businessmen 2005.
[4] Pg 36, VOLUME 14, NUMBER 5, December 2003, NBR Analysis Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah Zachary Abuza
[5] Pg.19, 20 Terrorism and its Financial Background, Cranfield University, Tom Maley




[1] Pg 7, Source : 9/11 Comission Report, Terrorism and its Financial Background, Cranfield University, Tom Maley
[2] According to Malaysian and Singaporean intelligence reports, Funding terrorism in Southeast Asia: the financial network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya. http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-3159694/Funding-terrorism-in-Southeast-Asia.html
[3] Pg. 4, VOLUME 14, NUMBER 5, December 2003, NBR Analysis Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah Zachary Abuza



[1] Terrorism and its Financial Background, Cranfield University, Tom Maley
[2] VOLUME 14, NUMBER 5, December 2003, NBR Analysis Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah Zachary Abuza
[3] Terrorism and its Financial Background, Cranfield University, Tom Maley
[4] Hendarmin Ranadireksa, Gema Pesan Bangsa, Bandung, 2007 – Hypothesis on discussion on Forum Rektor

Sunday, February 20, 2011

BALI BOMBING SERIES

BALI BOMBING SERIES
by Ir. Ade Muhammad, M.Han's Team I
Defense Studies 2010
Bandung Institute Technology


THE ABSTRACTION

Bali Bombing series are the most interesting experience that Indonesia have in combating terrorism. It happened twice, in the same place and on the short interval of time.
Shaking the basic fundamental of Indonesia’s national security and shocking the world, creating deep impact to the Indonesia as well regional countries.
This presentation would like to reveal the facts including the figures, impacts, reasoning why, response and Command & Control involves. After that, the analysis would be performing to surge the potential threats, opportunities, weaknesses and also the strength to Indonesian Counter Terrorism efforts. The analysis also consist of other tools, such as Route analysis, strategic mapping analysis, Operational theather analysis and organization structure analysis.
From this analysis, generated some ideas of important lesson as conclusion and the possible recommendation, consist of two internal and holistic strategy.

THE FACT’s

2002 Bali bombings
> Location Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia
> Date12 October 2002
23:05 (UTC+8)
> Attack type Suicide bombing, car bomb, and smaller bomb
> Target Location Paddy's Pub, Sari Club, US Consulate Denpasar
> Deaths 202 (152 of whom were foreign nationals, and 28 Indonesian citizens)
> Injured 209
> Perpetrator(s) Jemaah Islamiyah members – Amrozi, Ali Imron, Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, Dul Matin, Idris, Abdul Ghani and Umar Patek, Abu Dujana (Chief of Bali cell), 24 additional people

2005 Bali bombings
> Location Bali, Indonesia
> Date1 October 2005
6:50pm – ~ 7:00pm (UTC+8)
> Attack type Suicide bombings
> Target Location Raja's Restaurant at the Kuta Square shopping mall, warungs Jimbaran, near the Four Seasons Hotel + three unexploded bombs in Jimbaran
> Deaths 20 (including 3 suicide bombers)
> Injured 129
> Perpetrator(s) Jemaah Islamiyah member: Azahari Husin, Noordin Mohammed Top

The Impact; National
> Shattering the trust of public to Indonesian security, creating fear
> Shake the fundamental claim, Bali is the safest place in Indonesia
> Drastic downturn in Tourism economy from 1,355,282 tourist 2001 to 1,285,864 tourist in 2002
> 5,000 visitors / day 2004 to less than 1,000 visitor / day 2005
> Whilst Bali contributes around 40 percent of Indonesia's US$5 billion/y tourism revenue

The Impact;  tourism


Impact; International
- Target on US, Australian, Western Citizen à Travel Band
- Creating fear/terror and No Safe Heaven effect (Your Gov’t cannot protect you)
- Global Strike message to the Western world

Why Bali ?
Bali was selected as the site of the attacks because there was less chance of Indonesian gangsters being killed, and there was "a chance of getting a few foreigners  "

DR. Sidney Jones

Why Bali ?
 -  Soft Target
- Limited Security
 -  International Tourist Destination

The Respons ; BBI
-   Pursuit
- Investigation ; with Australian, US, UK investigator
- Arrest ;
n  Amrozi, Ali Imron, Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, Dul Matin, Idris, Abdul Ghani and Umar Patek, Abu Dujana (Chief of Bali cell), 24 additional people
- Punishment ;
n  9 November 2008, the three convicted of carrying out the bombings (Imam Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim, and Ali Ghufron) were executed by a firing squad, 18 September 2003 Ali Imron was sentenced to life imprisonment,   
n  On 3 March 2005, Bashir was found not guilty of the charges surrounding the 2003 bombing, but guilty of conspiracy over the 2002 attacks in Bali  (26 months)

The Respons ; BBII
- Political Respons ; Presient SBY condemned the blasts as a "criminal act" and has called for an urgent meeting with Indonesian security officials.     President SBY brief à Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Widodo AS, State Intelligence Agency Head Syamsir Siregar, Police Chief General Sutanto
- Pursuit ; fugitive  Nurdin Muhammed Top, Azahari
- Raid; 9 November 2005 Den 88 raid Azahari’s hide out and killed him (?)

C & C; BOMB BALI I & II

- POLICE HQ à Den 88
General Da’i Bachtiar, General Mangku Pastika (I)
Major General Ansyaad Mbai (II)
- TNI à Bais, Gultor, Kopassus
- BIN à CT Task Force

THE ANALYSIS

SWOT ANALYSIS; Indonesian Counter Terrorism

Strenght
 - New Police Den 88
 - Strong Political Will
 - Strong Indonesian Human Intelligence
 - Desk Counter Terror in every Kodam
- Society Resilience
- True teaching of Islam à Non Violence

 Weaknesses
-STOVE PIPING Agencies
-No Emergency Blue Print from the State
-Indonesia Blank Spot Sea Routes
-Terrorist Strong Funding support (Hawalla system)
-Terrorist Secure Communication (save draft-same password-e mail address technique)
-Intelligence Gap

 Opportunity
- International Help
- Obama peace support in Middle East (help a lot to reduce tension)
- Global War On Terror theme
- More Cooperation with Intl

 Threats
- Biology and Chemical warfare (to water system)
- Another Bomb (due because easy to made)
- Hostage Situation (target on bus, train, ferry)
- Sabotage (plot to explode Plumpang fuel depo)
- Political Assasination (Megawati assasination plot 2003 by Baasyir)


ANALYSIS ROUTE; Bali Bomb II – “The Advantage of Sea route”



They gathered the new selected Jihadist to Jepara city. In Jepara, they have to be reselected. From there the new Jihadist has to be trained in the Kangean island on Northern Madura Island. After the training, the New Jihadist was ready to have a mission and send to the transit point in Lombok Island. From Lombok Island they were deployed to designated mission area of Bali trough sea insertion. Note; all transportation since Jepara gathering point was using the sea routes and transportation to avoid the authorities sweeping operation.

Strategic Mapping Analysis
 


They operated with highly integrated networks, and each groups has independent but same roles (Hendarmin's Integrated Terror group model). The political connection in charge in the strategic protection to the terror groups’ cells, and the education connection have an important role to seek the fresh new Jihadist to be train, then supply to the terror group.

JI Operational Theather Analysis




ORGANIZATION STUCTURE ANALYSIS



THE CONCLUSION
important lesson

Stove Piping à creating; slow response, inadequate protection/prevention, vulnerability 
No Emergency Blue Print à creating; chaos, confusion, mistakes to mitigate the risk
Inteligence Gap àcreating; slow updating, not sharp infos, victim’s of disinformation warfare

THE RECOMENDATION
lesson learned


Recommendation; Internal  
1. Stove Piping à Integrated Ops Agency
    Stove piping means the units in the national security agencies does not communicate well to each other well. This create the most fundamental flaw in Republic of Indonesia Defense and National Security System.
    To remedy this basic flaw, there should be a political decision to Integrate all of Operational Agencies in the Defense and National Security Sector such as Sharing Intel info’s, Sea-Air-Land surveillance, Joint Ops, One CT C&C, etc.
2. No Emergency Blue Print à National Emergency Blue Print
    Proven that the State of RI doesnot have the modelling system of Emergency, especially the integrated one that could deal with future threats to the National Security such as Terrorism, Calamity, Outbreak, Political Chaos situation etc.
3. Inteligence Gap à Revitalization of Intelligence
    There was clearly an Inteligence Gap in the National Security System. Therefore needs to be enhance with the finishing of Inteligence Bill in the Parliament. With New Inteligence format there would be deeper penetration, intensive intel ops, using out of the box methodes, sufficient funding, more focus, and creates wider cooperation.
  
Recommendation; Holistic Strategy



In the past, after inteligence recognized the networks, the state could just eliminate the whole networks with clean and sweep move, disregarding the human rights issue.
But,
The State has change to become more democratic country with highest regard on the human rights because it’s the constitution’s message.
It is very imparitive and critical to do the CUT and SEPARATE the hardliners of the militant groups from the political wings and education.
This particular militant groups would be hunt down and destroyed, no doubt about it.
Whilst the political wings or simpatisant are given their rights to fight their values and goals through the democratic way and with peaceful way. No more forcing their believes to others.
And the education can continue their activities but have to receive the supervision and support from the government and transparancies.
There should be State guarantee no more student could be isolated from their parents for “BRAIN WASHING” to any particular subversive ideas.

Sources:

Hendarmin Ranadireksa's Integrated Terror Group Model
Bali Tourism Authority

Monday, February 14, 2011

Strategi Perisai Manusia Hamas?

Ir. Ade Muhammad, M.Han
Pemerhati Militer dan Terorisme


Strategi Perisai Manusia Hamas?
Insiden Mavi Marmara Ini hanyalah tip of the iceberg dari konflik antara Israel dan Hamas yang memperjuangkan Palestina.
Tanggal 31 Mei 2010, Israel melancarkan Operasi Sky Winds yang bertujuan untuk membajak 5 kapal sukarelawan pro Palestina yang sedang menuju Gaza Palestina yang sedang di blokade dengan membawa bantuan logistik kemanusiaan. Kapal kapal itu adalah Sfendoni, MS Sofia, Challenger 1, MV Mavi Marmara, Gazze dan Defne Y.
Terjadi perdebatan atas siapa penyebab korban jiwa, dimana versi sukarelawan, mereka melawan pasukan Sayeret 13 (Sayeret Mat’kal) yang mendarat di kapal Mavi Marmara karena mereka membela diri diserang di perairan internasional.
Pasukan israelpun dikabarkan menyerang mereka dan menyebabkan sembilan orang korban sukarelawan dari serangan jarak dekat, beberapa diantara mereka mendapat tembakan dari belakang kepala.
Sementara versi Israel seraya menunjukkan bukti video awal penyerbuan, memperlihatkan bahwa pasukan komando itu justru yang diserang dengan batangan besi, kursi dan bahkan terlihat pasukan komando menjadi bulan bulanan “sukarelawan militan” sebelum dilempar ke dek.
Senjata dari pasukan komando itu terdiri dari senjata pengendali massa berupa Paint Ball (senapan olahraga, berpeluru bulat plastik isi cat kecepatan rendah didorong oleh gas CO2) dan pistol pinggang 9 mm untuk kondisi darurat. Senjata pistol ini nampak direbut dan ditembakkan ke arah pasukan komando yang terus terjun.
Total sepuluh pasukan komando Sayeret 13 terluka sebelum mereka berhasil membungkam perlawanan para “sukarelawan militan” di atas kapal Mavi Marmara.
Tidak terjadi konflik berdarah di 4 kapal lainnya, karena tidak adanya perlawanan dari sukarelawan kepada pasukan komando yang menyergap.
Disini terlihat, ada atau tidaknya perlawanan, sudah terjadi fenomena perisai manusia dari warga internasional untuk menghadapi militer Israel. Menimbulkan banyak pertanyaan, salah satu yang terbesar adalah apakah ini adalah strategi perisai manusia ? Bagaimana bisa ini terjadi ?, siapa saja yang pernah melakukan? Dan Apakah efektif ? dalam konteks perlawanan terhadap Israel.
Blokade Laut Israel Blokade Israel di ambil pada Juni 2007 sesaat setelah Coup de t’at Hamas terhadap Presiden Palestina terpilih Mahmoud Abbas pada 15 Juni 2007, sebagai langkah final terhadap pengambil alihan kekuasaan politik secara paksa terhadap Fatah yang merupakan rival kuat Hamas di pemilu.
Banyak pemimpin Fatah di usir maupun ditangkap dan dimasukkan dalam penjara penjara di seluruh wilayah Palestina. Ini membuat proses perdamaian menjadi limbung dan kerja besar masyarakat Internasional termasuk tetangga tetangga Arab terancam gagal.
Inilah yang juga mendorong Mesir untuk melakukan blokade secara serentak bersama Israel untuk membatasi ruang gerak Hamas secara militer. Israel bersama Mesir memblokade perbatasan darat dan laut.
Israel menerapkan 3 mil blokade laut dari tepi pantai dan Mesir membangun penghalang baja bawah laut. Israel tetap membuka aliran logistik ke Jalur Gaza, namun diatur hanya seperempat dari jumlah normal sebelum di blokade.
Tujuan dari blokade ini untuk membatasi Hamas untuk kabur dan mendapatkan suplai roket Qassam serta amnunisi lain maupun tambahan personel dari jalur jalur logistik.
Pada teori blokade, ada 3 kategori blockade. Blokade Dekat (Close Blockade), Blokade berjarak (Distant Blockade) dan Blokade Lepas (Loose Blockade).
Blokade dekat, menempatkan kapal perang pada jarak pandang pada pantai atau pelabuhan, untuk reaksi yang cepat pada kapal yang datang atau pergi. Ini sulit karena harus membentuk rantai kapal perang yang rentan dengan berbagai ancaman, mulai cuaca, jarak suplai logistik yang lebih jauh (karena mereka diperairan musuh) sampai serangan dari pelabuhan musuh (yang logikanya kapal musuh dekat dengan suplai mereka dari pelabuhan).
Blokade berjarak, kapal perang pemblokade mengambil jarak dari pantai atau pelabuhan, namun akan menyergap kapal yang datang dan pergi. Ini memerlukan kapal yang lebih baik dan masih bisa beroperasi relatif dekat dengan pangkalan aju mereka.
Blokade lepas adalah melakukan blokade di luar jarak pandang dan namun tidak lebih. Ini akan membiarkan kapal musuh untuk berlayar dan kemudian dapat disergap atau di serang secara mendadak.
Sementara wilayah yang diblokade disebut juga sebagai wilayah steril atau jika tertembus objek tak diinginkan, disebut dengan Kill Zone atau Kill Box, zona bunuh atau kotak bunuh.
Dimana objek tak diinginkan harus segera dimusnahkan dengan segala cara yang ada pada Angkatan Laut yang menjaganya. Dalam konteks ini adalah Angkatan Laut Israel pada wilayah antara pantai Gaza sampai 3 mil laut.
Kemudian diluar Kill Zone itu, ada wilayah penyangga, yang merupakan daerah untuk mencegah dan mencegat objek sebelum dihancurkan di Kill Zone. Wilayah penyangga ini sangat penting, karena memang di maksudkan untuk menghindari pertumpahan darah (ditenggelamkannya kapal anti blokade) dan menjadi wilayah negosiasi yang disebut juga dengan Buffer Zone.
Otomatis Buffer Zone ini berada di wilayah Internasional namun sudah lazim dalam digunakan dalam sebuah blokade laut, sebagai ruang untuk menghalau objek atau kapal yang tidak diinginkan.
Jika masih saja, melaju biasanya dilakukan tindakan tindakan tidak mematikan (menenggelamkan kapal), seperti menembak tembakan peringatan, tembakan pada funnel (cerobong asap), penyergapan kapal, sampai pelumpuhan propeler kapal dengan tembakan meriam.
Menurut panduan San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 Juni 1994, Blokade laut dapat dikategorikan sah dalam perang laut, namun diatur dalam aturan aturan.
Seperti aturan harus ada daftar larangan apa yang dibawa dalam kapal yang akan masuk area blokade. Jika kapal itu diperiksa dan tidak ditemukan barang yang terlarang dalam operasi blokade, maka kapal itu harus dibiarkan untuk meneruskan perjalanan.
Penyergapan ini dapat dilakukan di wilayah perairan Internasional dan perairan yang diblokade. Namun tidak boleh pada wilayah perairan negara yang netral.
Dalam konteks blokade Laut pada Cuban Crisis, dilakukan penyergapan Angkatan Laut Amerika pada 25 Oktober 1962 pada jam 7.15 pagi kapal perang USS Essex dan USS Gearing mencoba menyergap kapal Bucharest namun tidak dilakukan karena sudah jelas itu adalah kapal tanker yang tidak membawa rudal nuklir ke Kuba. Kemudian pada jam 5 sore USS Kennedy diperintahkan untuk menyergap kapal angkut Lebanon Marcula. Namun keesokan harinya dilepaskan karena tidak membawa rudal nuklir dan barang lain yang dilarang dalam daftar larangan Amerika.
Dari sini Israel berargumentasi bahwa operasi blokade mereka masih dalam taraf yang diperbolehkan oleh hukum internasional mengenai blokade laut. Namun disayangkan adanya kontak fisik antara komando penyergap dan sukarelawan, sehingga menimbulkan korban jiwa.
Walaupun juga ada argumentasi yang mempertanyakan apakah barang logistik seperti makanan dan obat obatan termasuk dalam kategori berbahaya dan harus dilarang dalam blokade? Peace Spoiler Hamas Harakat al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya atau "Islamic Resistance Movement" disingkat dengan Hamas.
Hamas didirikan pada tahun 1988 dan pada piagamnya disebutkan ditujukan untuk pembentukan Negara Islam Palestina, ditempat Israel dan wilayah Palestina dan keinginan untuk memusnahkan Israel dari muka bumi.
Didirikan oleh Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Dalam teori manajemen konflik, perdamaian dan rekonsiliasi, mungkin Hamas dan Islamic Jihad dapat dikategorikan sebagai pengacau proses perdamaian (peace spoiler).
Dimana pada 4 Juni 2003 oleh kedua pemimpin organisasi tersebut ditegaskan untuk terus mengambil jalan kekerasan sementara Palestina dan Israel mulai mengambil jalan perundingan. Seperti PM. Ariel Sharon dan PM. Mahmoud Abbas melakukan komitmen untuk perdamaian yang dituangkan pada Roadmap for Peace.
Hamas melalui sayap militernya Brigade Izz ad-Din al-Qassam secara reguler menyerang Israel dengan kampanye bom bunuh diri terutama di bis bis serta restauran dan ketika Israel mulai 23 Juni 2002 memagari wilayah perbatasan, pada 6 Maret 2003 kampanye serangan dengan roket Qassampun dimulai.
Ini membuat ekskalasi konflik semakin meningkat antara Israel dan Palestina.
Membuat pemimpin Palestina semakin tidak berdaya. Tak kurang kampanye pembunuhan pucuk pimpinan Hamaspun dilakukan oleh Israel, tercatat mulai dari “The Engineer” Yihyeh Ayash pada 5 Januari 1996, Khald Mashaal pada September 1997, Saleh Shehadeh pada 23 Juli 2002, Ismail Abu Shanab pada 21 Agustus 2003, serangan gagal kepada pada 10 Juni 2003 (namun berhasil pada 17 April 2004), serangan gagal kepada Ahmed Yassin pada 6 September 2003 (namun pada akhirnya berhasil pada 22 Maret 2004), pemboman fasilitas latihan tempur Palestina di Syria pada 5 Oktober 2003, Izz El-Deen Al-Sheikh Khalil pada 26 September 2004.
Namun itu semua tidak menghentikan operasi militer Hamas. Bahkan pada perjanjian Persatuan Palestina di Mekah pada 8 Februari 2007 dimana Hamas dan Fatah akan berbagi kekuasaan, Hamas kembali menegaskan mereka tidak akan mengakui negara Israel.
Walaupun sudah ada perjanjian ini, Hamaspun tidak segan segan menyingkirkan Fatah dengan melakukan Coup berdarah pada 15 Juni 2007. Dengan serangan serentak di Gaza, menyerang serta menangkapi pemimpin pemerintahan dari Fatah, sehingga Presiden terpilih Palestina Mahmoud Abbas otomatis membubarkan pemerintahan persatuan karena pengkhianatan perjanjian Mekah ini.
Secara de facto Hamas berkuasa setelah berhasil memojokkan Fatah. Bahkan pada 13 November 2007 saat peringatan kematian Yasser Arafat, Hamas menembaki para pendukung Fatah yang juga warga Palestina itu dengan memakan korban 7 jiwa dan 55 terluka.
Kegiatan Hamas yang brutal juga membuat negara negara Arab yang merasa memberikan kontribusi perdamaian menjadi rikuh dan khawatir.
Sehingga ketika Israel memutuskan untuk 13 November 2007 mulai memblokade Gaza, Mesir dan Yordania juga ikut menutup perbatasan mereka.
Mereka tidak mau ambil resiko kalau personel Hamas sampai melarikan diri ke wilayah mereka. Serangan model ini berlangsung sampai diputuskan untuk melakukan operasi militer besar besaran pada 27 Februari 2008 dimana efektif menekan sementara posisi Hamas dan akhirnya saat itu menghasilkan gencatan senjata Israel – Hamas pada 19 Juni 2008 di Gaza.
Namun ini dirusak lagi dengan serangan Hamas berikutnya yaitu menggunakan buldozer pada 1 July 2008 di Yerusalem, kemudian pada 11 Juli 2008 dengan penyerangan prajurit Lance Corporal David Chriqui, 19 tahun dan kemudian serangan buldozer diulang lagi pada 22 July 2008.
Israel mencoba melunak dengan mengizinkan anggota Fatah kabur ke Mesir pada 4 Agustus 2008, membebaskan 200 tawanan Palestina pada 17 Agustus 2008 serta membolehkan dua kapal angkut sukarelawan kemanusiaan yang nekat menerabas blokade Israel untuk berlabuh di Gaza pada 23 Agustus 2008. Pada bulan Agustus 2008, dokter dokter yang berada dibawah kegiatan kemanusiaan Fatah melakukan protes dan aksi mogok pada penguasa Hamas.
Pada 5 September 2008 Israel masih mengijinkan persenjataan untuk pemerintah Palestina dan tambahan 500 polisi di Hebron pada 23 Oktober 2008. Strategi Perisai Manusia Kemudian metode Hamas juga berkembang dengan dugaan menggunakan strategi perisai manusia. Dimana dalam strategi ini, taktik Hamas adalah menembakkan roket roket Qassam dari tengah tengah pemukiman penduduk Gaza menuju wilayah Israel, yang membuat tembakan balasan dari wilayah Israel akan mengenai penduduk Gaza sendiri.
Berbagai taktik lain juga dikembangkan, merujuk pada strategi besar perisai manusia.
Ini membuat musuh mereka, Israel menjadi serba salah.
Jika mereka berdiam diri, maka warga Israel terus berjatuhan menjadi sasaran roket roket Qassam Hamas. Jika mereka bertindak membalas, maka mereka akan mengenai penduduk Gaza atau wilayah lain di Palestina dimana Hamas bersembunyi ditengah penduduk.
Ini dipastikan akan menuai kebencian dan kritik Internasional.
Tiba tiba pada 24 Desember 2008 diluncurkannya salvo sekitar 60 Roket Qassam dari wilayah pemukiman padat penduduk di Gaza oleh Hamas serta beberapa kelompok kecil lainnya, dan ini memancing reaksi keras dari Israel.
Merekapun melancarkan Operasi Oferet Yetzuka (Operation Cast Lead) pada 27 Desember 2008. Israel menyerang dengan serangan udara bertubi tubi pada fasilitas peluncuran roket roket, pabrikan pembuat roket, lorong lorong penyelundupan serta pusat komando dan kontrol tempur Hamas.
Namun seperti yang sudah diduga, operasi ini juga membawa serta korban jiwa penduduk sipil Palestina, yang memang sudah dirancang dengan cerdik oleh Hamas.
Tidak kurang dari total 1,300 korban jiwa di pihak Palestina. Kebanyakan adalah sipil tak berdosa.
Pada 18 Januari 2009 Hamas keluar dan mendeklarasikan gencatan senjata, walaupun ada prakteknya masih ada tembakan roket Qassam disana sini yang dibalas juga oleh Israel dengan serangan balasan terbatas.
Walaupun gaya operasi Israel sudah mulai berubah, tidak seperti era lalu yang selalu tertutup, sekarang humas IDF sibuk menayangkan berbagai hasil operasi militer presisinya, tapi korban jiwa sipil memang tidak terelakkan lagi.
Operasi Oferet Yetzuka pun dihentikan namun Israel sudah kadung menuai kritikan dan kecaman dunia.
Setelah efektif di blokade, Hamaspun secara cerdik beralih pada dukungan global, terutama dari dunia Islam.
Dimana di organisir kegiatan menembus blokade untuk membawa logistik ke Gaza dan akhirnya membawa pada insiden Mavi Marmara.
Ini pun tidak lepas dari dugaan menggunakan strategi perisai manusia. Korban jiwa pada pihak warga sipil Internasional oleh militer Israel menjadi sebuah “komoditi” yang laris di eksploitasi melalui media dunia dan digunakan sepenuhnya untuk membungkam Israel.
Intinya dengan strategi perisai manusia, ternyata lebih efektif untuk mengalahkan musuh dengan memanfaatkan opini publik dunia.
Bagi pihak Hamas, ini adalah sebuah kemenangan.
Ini juga memperluas spektrum konflik Israel dengan dunia, terutama dunia Islam. Hamaspun dituduh mempunyai taktik turunan dari strategi perisai manusia, dengan menggunakan perisai anak anak dan mengembangkan model rekrutmen prajurit anak. Perisai anak ini diperlihatkan dalam video propaganda Israel, yang memperlihatkan anak yang dipaksa dua prajurit Hamas untuk melindungi mereka dari penembak runduk IDF.
Kemudian video lain memperlihatkan seorang yang dijelaskan sebagai militan Hamas menggunakan anak sebagai perlindungan untuk berpindah posisi. Pada November 2006, IDF juga mengingatkan tersangka peluncur roket Muhammad Weil Baroud untuk keluar dari wilayah pengungsi Jabalya. Namun Hamas malah memanggil sukarelawan yang kebanyakan wanita dan anak anak untuk datang ke rumah dekat lokasi, sehingga IDF membatalkan serangan udara.
Untuk program prajurit anak, Hamas juga diserang oleh bukti video dari sumber sumber Arab, yang memperlihatkan anak anak dibawah umur 15 tahun berlatih militer. Anak anak ini sangat berguna dalam kegiatan penyelundupan senjata serta peledak, atau sengaja disuruh bermain main ketika operasi penembakan roket Qassam, untuk mencegah serangan balasan.
Hamas secara resmi mengakui adanya program untuk melatih anak anak bersenjata, namun mengutuk serangan oleh prajurit anak.
Ini menyusul serangan bunuh diri dari 3 anak belasan tahun yang menyerang pos Israel di Netzarim, sentral Gaza pada tahun 2002.
Sukses dari pelanggaran HAM musuh Target utama dari strategi perisai manusia adalah agar musuh melakukan pelanggaran HAM sebanyak banyaknya. Dimana HAM sendiri menjadi agenda dunia untuk ditegakkan, selain Demokrasi dan Lingkungan Hidup. Melanggar HAM berarti melawan agenda dunia dan Amerikapun tidak akan sanggup membela pelanggar HAM jika opini global sudah terbentuk.
Contoh contoh seperti Holocaust dimana kekejaman Jerman Nazi pada PD II, membuat Internasional terutama Amerika dan Inggris trenyuh dan memberikan bangsa Yahudi negara Israel.
Sementara Pelanggaran HAM militer Perancis di Aljazair menuai kritik dari dalam negeri Perancis dan memaksa untuk memberikan kemerdekaan terhadap Aljazair.
Tidak lupa Amerika bernasib sama seperti Perancis di Vietnam, dimana publik Amerika tidak setuju dengan pelanggaran HAM di perang Vietnam. Memaksa Presiden Amerika menarik mundur pasukannya dari Vietnam.
Sementara itu pelanggaran HAM Indonesia era Presiden Soeharto di Timor Timur juga mendapat kecaman serta tekanan dunia Internasional dan memaksa Indonesia memberikan referendum pada Timor Timur. Namun Indonesia juga pernah menggunakan pada masa lalu taktik Pagar Betis, yang menjejerkan warga sipil dalam pengepungan, sementara TNI berada dibelakang untuk membungkam perlawanan pemberontak DI/TII dan PKI pada era 50-60 an. Ini membawa sukses karena efisiensi yang tinggi walaupun berdarah dingin dan pemerintah saat itu juga mendapat kritik dari pemerhati masalah kemanusiaan.
Sekarang taktik pagar betis tidak digunakan lagi karena kesadaran HAM di TNI. Ini membuktikan bahwa pelanggaran HAM akan mengakibatkan opini publik dan dunia akan membawa keuntungan politis bagi yang tertindas.
Dalam konteks ini pelanggaran HAM Israel pada warga Palestina akan menguntungkan pada tujuan politik Hamas. Jika benar Hamas menggunakan Strategi Perisai Manusia, maka apakah pelanggaran HAM Israel pada penduduk Palestina (dan sekarang penduduk dunia), akan membawa mereka pada kemenangan yang hakiki? Waktu yang akan menjawabnya.